



*Riphah Journal of Islamic Thought & Civilization*

Published by: Department of Islamic Studies,

Riphah International University, Islamabad

Email: [editor.rjtc@riphah.edu.pk](mailto:editor.rjtc@riphah.edu.pk)

Website: <https://journals.riphah.edu.pk/index.php/rjtc>

ISSN (E): 3006-9041 (P): 2791-187X



## An Analytical Study of the Concept of An-Naṣb and Its Adaptation in the Twelver Shiism

Waliyullahi Adeola Adeyemi<sup>i</sup>

### Abstract

*The Twelvers remain the most prominent Shiite denomination in Islamic world today. The Islamic Republic of Iran adopted the Twelver tenets as its theological and political doctrines, including several countries in the Arab world and African continents. The present study explores the Shiite perception of an-naṣb (hostility to the Ahlul-Bayt) as enshrined in the Shiite theological and jurisprudential works. The research is based on textual analysis to garner information. It was observed that an-naṣb (hostility to the Ahlul-Bayt) and nāṣib (Ahlul-Bayt adversary) had been strictly adopted by the Twelver theologians and jurists to discredit other Shiite denominations and Muslim sects. Moreover, the two parlances (an-naṣb and nāṣib) are primarily coined to entrench Hz. Ali's Imamate as well as to declare other non-Shiite Muslims out of the fold of faith. The study therefore recommends that further research be made within the context of Twelver Shiism to unravel other concepts as embedded in the Twelver theological and juristic treatises.*

**Keywords:** Twelvers, an-naṣb, nāṣib, theologians, jurists and Ahlul-Bayt.

### A. Introduction

Shiism, among other sects in Islām, has played a tremendous role in the development of Muslim theological and doctrinal beliefs. Lexically, *Shī'ah* anglicised as Shiite (pl. *Shiya`*) means followers, adherents, disciples, faction, party or sect. *Shī'ah* is rather known as the faction of Hz. Ali bin Abī Ṭālib, the Prophet's son-in-law. Also, '*ashyā`*', which is another plural form of *Shī'ah* means partisans.<sup>1</sup> Ad-Dimashqiyyah sees *Shī'ah* as a mere description of the supporters of Hz. Ali or Hz. Mu`āwiyah in the battle of Ṣiffīn, but its contemporary usage could mean a group of people who are independent of the Sunnis in terms of

<sup>i</sup> Lecturer, Department of Islamic Studies, Al-Hikmah University, Nigeria  
[adeyemiwaliyullahi@alhikmah.edu.ng](mailto:adeyemiwaliyullahi@alhikmah.edu.ng)

doctrines, jurisprudence and interpretation of religious texts.<sup>2</sup> Shiism had begun as a mere political faction called *Shī'atu* Hz. Ali (Hz. Ali's party) after the battle that erupted between Hz. Ali and Hz. Mu'āwiyah at Shīffīn. However, the martyrdom of Hz. Ḥusayn at Karbalā' coupled with the Shiite upheavals throughout the Umayyad caliphate transformed the Hz. Ali's party from a political group into a theological sect.<sup>3</sup> The incident of Karbalā' was further described by Hitti as the foundation of the Shiite creed as it later culminated in the collapse of the Umayyad dynasty in 750 CE. This is because the tenth of Muḥarram in which Hz. Ḥusayn was massacred lingered on as a day of lamentation and rebirth of Shiism in the Shiite world. The first ten days of Muḥarram were so significant to the extent that the Shiites used to converge at strategic places to recall some multidimensional events of Karbalā'.<sup>4</sup>

In the discourse surrounding the history of Shi'ism as a distinct sect, one figure who has been frequently mentioned and discussed in both Shi'a and Sunni literature is Abdullah bin Saba. A Shiite scholar, An-Nūbakhṭī has it that, 'Abdullāh bin Saba' was among those who denounced Hz. Abū Bakr, Hz. Umar and Hz. Uthmān, and dissociated himself from the Prophet's Companions, and he falsely admitted that Hz. Ali instructed him to do so. Hz. Ali later apprehended him and he confessed to him, then Hz. Ali ordered his public execution. The admirers of Hz. Ali exclaimed, O leader of the faithful! Will you execute a man inviting people to profess your love, the *Ahlul-Bayt*, your divine imamate, and to dissociate from your enemies? Then Hz. Ali exiled him to Madā'in (the then capital of Iran).<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, some classical Shiite works laden with the story of Ibn Saba' include Al-Majlisī's narrative who reported 'Abdullāh bin Saba' to have ascribed Prophethood and divinity to Hz. Ali, but the latter castigated the former after his public confession.<sup>6</sup> However, this narrative could be buttressed by the Twelver *tafsīr* of Q16:51 where the word '*Ilāh* (God) was interpreted by Ja'far Aṣ-Ṣādiq as Imām.<sup>7</sup> Another Shiite report establishes that Ibn Saba' was a Jewish man who lived in Ṣan'ā', the capital of Yaman, and later lived in Madā'in after he embraced Islām through Hz. Ali. Ibn Saba' was reported to have held that Hz. Ali did not die, but he was rather raised to the sky like Jesus and he shall return to fill the earth with justice.<sup>8</sup> Based on these historical antecedents of Ibn Saba', it is arguable, that, the books of Islamic history are replete with his conflicting stories which could not be completely mythical.

*Ahlul-Bayt* (the Prophet's household), according to Shiite theology, refers to five specific personalities, namely, the Prophet (PBUH), and his daughter, Hz. Fāṭimah, Hz. Ali and his two sons, Hz. Ḥasan and Hz. Ḥusayn. These five individuals are likewise known as *aṣḥābul-kisā'* (People of the Mantle),<sup>9</sup> they are believed to be referenced in the Qur'ān in the verse: '*for Allāh only wants to remove from you every impurity, O the Prophet's household, and to purify you to utmost purity* (Q33:33). This is rather known as *Āyatut-taṭhīr* (Verse of Purity). However, the exclusion of the wives of the Prophet (PBUH) generated a heated debate between the Shiite and the Sunni scholars. Arguably, since the

Q33:32 had started with *O the Prophet's wives*, while the Q33:34 adopted a feminine command *wadhkurna* (and bear in mind), it is not far-fetched, based on the rule of Arabic syntax that, the Prophet's wives were among the purified persons. It is also far-fetched to assume that the plural feminine command '*wadhkurna*' in Q33:34 was exclusively used for Hz. Fāṭimah. Furthermore, the Shiites opposed the tradition which reported that the Prophet (PBUH) had left the Qur'ān and the Sunnah as his legacies. Rather they upheld that the Prophet (PBUH) had left the two weighty legacies; the Qur'ān and his household (*'itrah*). These two weighty legacies are inseparable till eternity. Thus, the Shiites, by extension, posited that the appointed successors of the Prophet (PBUH) were known as the twelve infallible Imāms (Hz. Ali, Hz. Ḥasan, Hz. Ḥusayn and other nine children from Hz. Ḥusayn's lineage).<sup>10</sup>

In addition, the Shiite perception of *ḥadīthul-kisā'* (Tradition of the Mantle) is yet unresolved in Twelver Shiism as the exclusion of Hz. Ḥasan's progeny from imamate remains a rhetorical question. Conversely, Hz. Ḥusayn, before his martyrdom, did not rule over any community except his clan.<sup>11</sup> By and large, the *Ahlul-Bayt* who were among the Prophet's Companions, are to be revered and not idolised. The Twelvers upheld that seeking Allāh's benediction upon the Prophet (PBUH) without his household is a futile worship. Muslims are obliged to pray for the Prophet (PBUH) and his household in unison as embedded in the *Ṣalātul-Ibrāhīmiyyah*. In addition, the Shiites upheld that the *Ahlul-Bayt* knowledge was divinely inspired and not acquired. This is the rationale behind the Shiite tradition which describes Hz. Ali as the gateway to the city of the Prophet's knowledge.<sup>12</sup> Hence, Hz. Ali could neither be said to have assumed the Prophetic status nor received divine revelation after the Prophet (PBUH).

## **B. Tenets of the Twelver Shiism *vis-à-vis* An-Naṣb**

The Twelvers remain the majority of the world's Shiite population. They are majorly found in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and Lebanon. They have significant adherents in India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar as well as some West African countries like Nigeria and Ghana. Due to the success of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, The Islamic Republic of Iran upheld the tenets of the Twelver Shiism as her official doctrine in the state affairs.<sup>13</sup> Several theological treatises have described the Twelvers either as *al-Imāmiyyah* (Imamate sect) or *ar-Rāfiḍah* (the rejectionists). The former name was ascribed to the Shiites due to their belief in specific Twelve Imāms whom they considered as the appointed successors of the Prophet (PBUH),<sup>14</sup> while the latter title was given to the Shiites who ostracised Zayd bin Ali bin al-Ḥusayn for being indifferent to the denigration of the first two caliphs, Hz. Abū Bakr and Hz. Umar.<sup>15</sup> Today, the Sunnis used to address the Twelvers as *ar-Rāfiḍah* due to their political dogma of reviling the Prophet's Companions to attain spirituality. However, the Twelver tradition reveals that *ar-Rāfiḍah* was conferred by Allāh on the seventy men who left the Fir'aun's laity to join the fold of Hz. Mūsā. It was added that the

title was mentioned in the past scriptures, the Tawrah and the Injīl, while the Shiites later earned the title from the tongue of the Prophet (PBUH).<sup>16</sup>

*An-Naṣb*, according to the Twelver theologians, refers to hostility towards the *Ahlul-Bayt*, while the person who is hostile to the Prophet's household (*Ahlul-Bayt*) is called *nāṣib* or *nāṣibī*. The word *nāṣib* is one of the Shiite political dogmas relating to *Ja'fari* jurisprudence. The word *nāṣib* is adopted by the modern Shiites to describe whoever pronounces hostility to the Shiites or professes the caliphates of Hz. Abū Bakr and Hz. Umar. It also denotes professing the love of Hz. Ali alongside his adversaries (the three precedent caliphs) or denying the virtues and Imamate of any of the Twelve Imāms. This concept of *naṣb* was extensively discussed by classical and contemporary Shiite jurists under the rulings on *najāsah* (impurity), *ṭahārah* (purification), *zakāh* (alms), *khums* (one-fifth alms), *nikāh* (marital contract) and *jihād* (religious struggle).<sup>17</sup> Due to the Twelvers' political dichotomy, other Shiite sub-sects like the Zaydis, Wāqifis and Fuṭhis are conjoined with the Kharijites.<sup>18</sup> The Kharijites were the earliest and staunchest enemies of the Shiites who dissented from Hz. Ali's army in the battle of Ṣiffīn. The Kharijites were twelve thousand men who left Hz. Ali's army for the village of Ḥarūrā' near Kūfah. They believed neither Hz. Ali nor Hz. Mu'āwiyah was qualified to rule the Islamic State. Thus, they appointed a new leader called Abdullāh bin Al-Kawwā' to demonstrate their political conservatism.<sup>19</sup> Through the intervention of Hz. Ibn Abbās, about two thousand Kharijites retracted their political doctrine. However, the effort of Hz. Ali was to convince most of them. But they met their Waterloo in the battle of Nahrawān.<sup>20</sup>

It should be noted that another synonymous term with *nāṣib* (pl. *nawāṣib*) is *mukhālīf* (dissenter). Although some Shiite scholars claimed that the two terms have different connotations, they are often used interchangeably in the Shiite theological and juristic polemics. The Shiite scholars posited that the majority of the Prophet's Companions who fought against Hz. Ali in the battles of Ṣiffīn and Jamal (Battle of the Camel) among the Makkan, Madinite and Syrian people are *nawāṣib* (*Ahlul-Bayt* adversaries). Similarly, due to the incident of Karbalā', the Shiites surmised that Yazīd was an infidel (*kāfir*).<sup>21</sup> The Shiites accentuated that, Adh-Dhabbī, the Sunni traditionist and historian, espoused that, Yazīd was a *nāṣib* (*Ahlul-Bayt* adversary) as he started his rule with the murder of Hz. Ḥusayn and ended it up with the Battle of Al-Ḥarrah. These civil wars made the pious Muslims of his time detest him.<sup>22</sup> Al-Khumaynī reveals that even though the people of the aforementioned provinces were hostile to Hz. Ali due to some political dissensions, there was no proof to substantiate that the *Ahlul-Bayt* Imāms had ostracised them during the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates. So the dogma of *nāṣib* evolved precisely during the eras of the fifth and the sixth Shiite Imāms, Muḥammad Al-Bāqir and Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq.<sup>23</sup>

Nebil Husayn traced the origin of the dogma to the incident of *ḥadīthul-'ifk* (slander affair), when Hz. Ā'ishah was accused of infidelity after the battle of Banū Al-Muṣṭaliq. He

claimed that the Sunni tradition upholds that HZ. Ali was the source of the calumny made against her. In contradistinction to this view, he said *Ṣaḥīḥ Al-Bukhārī* had omitted the portions of the accusation from the alleged tradition.<sup>24</sup> However, Allāh had vindicated HZ. Ā'ishah by the revelation of the Q24:11. It is therefore unfair to assume that Imām HZ. Ali had spearheaded the slander, since the *sīrah* (the Prophet's biography) had revealed that the rumour was the handiwork of the Madinan hypocrites.<sup>25</sup>

The Shiites upheld that, the profession of *shahādah* (statement of testimony), does not qualify a non-Shiite to become a true Muslim. They also claimed that whoever denies the legitimacy of HZ. Ali's Imamate is like a pagan who denies the Prophethood of HZ. Muḥammad (PBUH).<sup>26</sup> Muhibbullah argues that since HZ. Ali's love is the trademark of faithfulness and his hatred is faithlessness, every *nāṣib* is a grave sinner.<sup>27</sup> Berende categorised the Muslims into three divisions, namely; those who neither follow the *Ahlul-Bayt* nor hate them (nominal Muslims), those who know them and follow them (the Shiites), and those who know them and fight them (*Ahlul-Bayt* adversaries). The last division of Muslims is the *nawāṣib*.<sup>28</sup>

### C. *An-Naṣb* as Hostility to the *Ahlul-Bayt* and the Shiites

It is incontrovertible to assert that the Shiite perception of the term '*nāṣib*' is not only restricted to the meaning of hostility to the *Ahlul-Bayt*, rather it is extended to any form of hostility to their followers, the Shiites. A preponderant number of Shiite reports have clarified the meanings as follow:

عن أبي عبد الله قال: ليس الناصب من نصب لنا أهل البيت، لأنك لا تجد أحدا يقول: أنا أبغض محمداً وآل محمد، ولكن الناصب من نصب لكم وهو يعلم أنكم تتولوننا وأنكم من شيعتنا.<sup>29</sup>

Narrated Abū Abdillāh who said: A *nāṣib* is not the person who declares war against the *Ahlul-Bayt* because you will not find a person who professes the hatred of the Prophet and his household, but a *nāṣib* is the one who hates you after knowing that you loved us and you are our true followers, the Shiites.

Another tradition reads:

عن علي بن محمد أنّ محمد بن علي بن عيسى كتب إليه يسأله عن الناصب، هل أحتاج في امتحانه إلى أكثر من تقديمه الجبّت والطاغوت واعتقاد إمامتهما؟ فرجع الجواب: من كان على هذا فهو ناصب.<sup>30</sup>

Narrated Ali bin Muḥammad who said Muḥammad bin Ali bin Īsā wrote to him inquiring about the clarification of the meaning of *nāṣib*. And he said: Do I need to probe into this matter other than believing the precedent Imamate of Al-Jibt (Abū Bakr) and Aṭ-Ṭāghūt (Umar)? And then he replied: whoever is upon this belief is a *nāṣib*.

By a means of reconciling the seemingly contradictory traditions above, it could be said that the second tradition unmasks the in-depth perception of the parlance as hatred towards the Shiites while the second tradition established that belief in the caliphates of Hz. Abū Bakr and Hz. Umar before Hz. Ali is the parameter for identifying a *nāṣib* (Shiite adversary) even though he did not take up arms against the *Ahlul-Bayt*, while. So the latter meaning gives an insight into the contemporary usage of the word in the Shiite theological and juristic discourses. Al-Baḥrānī argues that every verse of the Qur'ān that contains the word *mushrik* (polytheist) refers to a *nāṣib*. He further said that several recurrent reports from the *Ahlul-Bayt* have affirmed that the Sunnis are the *nawāṣib* (*Ahlul-Bayt* adversaries).<sup>31</sup> Since the Sunnis had firmly established the caliphates of Hz. Abū Bakr and Hz. Umar, the Shiite scholars have unanimously agreed that Abū Ḥanīfah and other Sunni Imāms are *nawāṣib*. Although Abū Ḥanīfah did not loathe the *Ahlul-Bayt*, he became guilty of *naṣb* for postulating his independent opinion (*ra'y*) alongside Hz. Ali's in his legal verdicts.<sup>32</sup> Appositely, the Shiites have applied the rule of *naṣb* to the Hanafites and other Sunni Schools of Jurisprudence. Al-Qummī, the preeminent Twelver exegete, has interpreted *al-maghdūb alayhim* (people on whom Allāh's wrath is evoked) in Q1:7 as the *nawāṣib* (*Ahlul-Bayt* adversaries) and the *dāllūn* (the misguided) as those who are skeptical or failed to recognise the Imamate of ʿAlī.<sup>33</sup>

#### D. An-Naṣb in the Context of the Twelver Jurisprudence

It is of prime importance to state that the Twelvers heavily relied on the juristic verdicts of the sixth Shiite Imām, Jaʿfar aṣ-Ṣādiq, who they popularly accepted as the teacher of the two Sunni jurists, Imāms Abū Ḥanīfah and Mālik. Thus, Jaʿfar aṣ-Ṣādiq was the practical founder of the Shiite School of Jurisprudence called *al-madhab al-Jaʿfarī*.<sup>34</sup> Most Shiite reports usually refer to his filial appellation or cognomen, Abū Abdillāh, instead of his real name. Some juristic polemics relating to *nāṣib* in the classical Shiite *fiqh* literature are rulings on a *nāṣib*'s status of purity, funeral bath, prayer rituals, pilgrimage, denigration, wealth, murder and marital contract. Regarding the purity status of a *nāṣib*, Al-Khūʿī argues that the soundest opinion is that the *nawāṣib* have similar juristic rulings to that of the *kuffār* (infidels). Some Shiite scholars considered the *nawāṣib* as the *ahlul-kitāb* (People of the Book),<sup>35</sup> thereby considering them as spiritually impure. One of the Shiite traditions reads:

عن أبي عبد الله قال: وإياك أن تغتسل من عُسالة الحمام، ففيها تجتمع عُسالة اليهودي والنصراني والمجوسي والتَّاصِب لنا أهل البيت وهو شرُّهم، فإنَّ الله تبارك وتعالى لم يخلُق خلقاً أنجسَ من الكلب وإنَّ التَّاصِب لنا أهل البيت لأنجسَ منه.<sup>36</sup>

Narrated Abū ʿAbdillāh who said: Beware of bathing inside the slop of the bathroom, for the Jewish, Christian and Magian spilt water is gathered therein, and the *nāṣib* (*Ahlul-Bayt* adversary) is the worst of them. Allāh has not created any creature that is filthier than a dog but the *nāṣib* is filthier than it.

The above tradition affirms the *nāṣib*'s physical and spiritual impurity. Based on this textual proof, the Shiites considered the *nāṣib*'s acts of worship as void. One could deduce from the tradition that hostility to the Prophet's household might preclude a *nāṣib* from attaining physical purity which serves as a prerequisite for attaining spirituality. Al-Khumaynī asserts that the Shiite jurists unanimously agreed that the *nawāṣib* are physically impure and it is prohibited to use their leftover water (*su'r*). Although he claimed that there was no explicit evidence affirming the *nawāṣib*'s spiritual impurity, their afterlife punishment will be grievous than that of the *kuffār* (infidels).<sup>37</sup>

Regarding the ruling on a *nāṣib*'s funeral bath, the Shiites held that it is not permitted for a believer (Shiite) to wash the corpse of a *mukhālīf* (Sunni),<sup>38</sup> rather he should delegate the *ahlul-kitāb* (Jew or Christian) to carry out the task, but if none could be found, his funeral bath is no longer compulsory.<sup>39</sup> It is not permitted for a Twelver to offer funeral prayer over a *nāṣib*'s corpse as he had died as an infidel, rejecting Ali's Imamate. Hence, the Twelvers tenaciously held that the case of a *nāṣib*'s funeral is similar to that of the hypocrites as the Prophet (PBUH) was instructed thus: *And never offer prayer for anyone of them who dies and do not stand by his grave* (Q9:84). Al-Baḥrānī quoting from Al-Mufīd accentuates that, there is no divergent opinion among the Twelvers on this verdict.<sup>40</sup>

Concerning the *nāṣib*'s prayer rituals, the Twelvers posited that it is prohibited to pray behind a *nāṣib* except in a state of *taqiyyah* (dissimulation). Rather the Shiites are obliged to first observe their obligatory prayers at home before proceeding to the mosque.<sup>41</sup> This juristic ruling is based on the Shiite creed that the *nāṣib*'s acts of worship are null until he professes Hz. Ali's Imamate alongside the statement of testimony. The report reads:

عن أبي عبد الله أنه قال: لا يُبالي التَّاصِبُ صَلَّى أم زنى، وهذه الآية نزلت فيهم: "عاملَةٌ ناصبةٌ تصلى نارا حامية".<sup>42</sup>

Narrated Jaʿfar aṣ-Ṣādiq to have said: The *nāṣib* is less concerned whether he prays or commits adultery, for these

verses were revealed in respect of him: toiling, weary; they shall enter a burning fire (Q88:3-4).

The above Shiite tradition shows that the prayer rituals of a *nāṣib* neither avert him from the grave punishment nor save him from the hellfire. It also reveals that there is no significant difference between the reward of a *nāṣib*'s righteous and sinful deeds. Credence to this claim is that of Al-Majlisī, who reports that the adversary of Hz. Ali's Imamate will not leave this ephemeral world until he gulps from boiling water.<sup>43</sup> In the same vein, some Shiite scholars upheld that a *nāṣib* only receives the reward for his righteous deeds after recognition of Hz. Ali's Imamate except for *zakāh* (alms). Therefore, Al-Baḥrānī's claim that the *nāṣib*'s pilgrimage is valid<sup>44</sup> contradicts Imām Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq's verdict which sanctions the repetition of the *nāṣib*'s pilgrimage after conversion to Shiism.<sup>45</sup> Amazingly, despite the impurity of the *nawāṣib*, the mainstream Shiite jurists opined that it is permissible to mingle and interact with the *nawāṣib* in some sacred places of worship like the *ka'bah* and Madinah.<sup>46</sup> As regards denigrating a *nāṣib*, Al-Jawāhirī submitted that the Shiite scholars were unanimous on the permissibility of backbiting, reviling and cursing the *nawāṣib* as he succinctly put:

الظاهر إلحاق المخالفين بالمشركين في ذلك: لإلحاد الكفر الإسلامي والإيماني فيه، بل لعلّ هجاءهم على رؤوس الأشهاد من أفضل عبادة العباد ما لم تمنع التقية... لكن لا يخفى على الخبير الماهر-الواقف على ما تضافرت به التصوص بل تواترت: من لعنهم وسبهم وشتهم وكفرهم وأنهم مجوس هذه الأمة وأشر من النصارى وأنجس من الكلاب.<sup>47</sup>

The practice of reviling the pagans applies to the *Ahlul-Bayt* adversaries due to their faithlessness. For reviling them, based on ample testimonies, is one of the virtuous acts of worship as far as one is not precluded by dissimulation...it is not hidden to an inquiring mind based on the Shiite recurrent reports that, the practice of cursing, denigrating and imputing infidelity to the *Ahlul-Bayt* adversaries is plausible; for the *Ahlul-Bayt* adversaries are the Magians of this nation, worse than the Christians and filthier than dogs.

The Shiite scholars held the opinion that cursing the *Ahlul-Bayt* adversaries is a commendable act of worship through which they attain divine rewards. Moreover, the Shiite scholars posited that it is permissible for the Twelvers to plunder and consume the property of the *nawāṣib*, especially the confiscated property by the security operatives in as much as they allocate its *khums* (one-fifth alms) to the designated Shiite Imām in their respective locality.<sup>48</sup> Credence to this claim is the report below:

عن أبي عبد الله قال: خذ مال الناصب حيثما وجدته وادفع إلينا الخمس.<sup>49</sup>



Narrated Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq who said: Plunder the property of a *nāṣib* wherever you find it and pay one-fifth of its proceeds to us.

The above narration permits plundering the wealth of a *nāṣib* as long as its *khums* are duly paid to the Shiite Imām of any locality. A report mentions that the killing of *nawāṣib* is permissible in such a way that no one becomes aware of it.

عن ابن فرقد قال: قلت لأبي عبد الله: ما تقول في قتل النّاصب؟ قال حلال الدّم أتقي عليك فإن قدير أن تقبل عليه حائطاً أو تغرقه في الماء لكي لا يُشْهَد به عليك فافعل.<sup>50</sup>

Narrated Ibn Farqad who said: I asked Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq about killing a *nāṣib*? He said: Shedding his blood is lawful, but if you could push a wall over him or drown him in the water for no one to be aware of the murder, you can do so.

Based on the above tradition, Namāzī elucidated in his commentary that the Shiite scholars permitted the killing of the *nawāṣib* (*Ahlul-Bayt* adversaries), and they even viewed it as an obligatory act, especially when no one is aware of the murder and could not result to any form of litigation.<sup>51</sup> Pertinently, the Shiite scholars and jurists were also unanimous that it is prohibited to have a marital contract with a *nāṣibah* (a non-Shiite or Sunni woman).<sup>52</sup> The report that invalidates this form of marriage reads:

عن أبي عبد الله، قال: لا ينبغي للرجل المسلم منكم أن يتزوج النّاصبيّة، ولا يزوّج ابنته ناصبيّاً، ولا يطرحها عنده.<sup>53</sup>

Narrated Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq who said: it does not behove a male Shiite Muslim to marry a non-Shiite or Sunni woman, and he should not marry his daughter to a non-Shiite or Sunni man, and let him not throw away her daughter unto him.

From the above tradition, it is clear that Imām Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq considered the marriage of a Shiite male Muslim to a non-Shiite woman as invalid, to the extent of likening the practice to the similitude of a man whose daughter's hand has not been sought in marriage before consummation. This issue as well as other aforementioned ones shall be examined in the light of the pristine Islām, logical proofs and historical antecedents.

### E. A Critical Analysis of the Twelvers' Perception of *An-Naṣb*

It is crystal clear from the foregoing that the Twelver scholars upheld that antagonism to the *Ahlul-Bayt* is justified by believing the succession of Hz. Abū Bakr and Hz. Umar after the Prophet's demise. Thus, the tradition that singled out believing the first two caliphs without the third was inaccurate. Hence, the appointment of the three precedent caliphs was

based on a mutual consensus of the companions. Had it been the belief that Hz. Ali's Imamate is the only yardstick for being loyal to the *Ahlul-Bayt*, the Prophet (PBUH) would have explained it to his companions in unambiguous expressions.

There is a clear discrepancy between Berende's categorisation of Muslims and the Shiite textual provisions. An alleged Prophetic tradition in *Al-Kāfī* perceives those who neither recognise the *Ahlul-Bayt* nor despise them as infidels. This tradition sees whoever dies and does not recognise his Imām, to have died in a state of barbarism.<sup>54</sup> Since the Imamate tussle was said to have erupted after the Prophet's demise, the statement could not be linked to the pristine doctrines of Islām. Rather, it is a mere assertion aimed at preserving the Twelver political dogma.

The Muslims had been only commanded to give unconditional obedience to the Prophet (PBUH) for the attainment of true salvation as enshrined in Q4:80. Based on the allegorical interpretation of *aş-şirātul-mustaqīm* (the right path) as recognition of Hz. Ali's Imamate, the Twelvers held that a reprobate Shiite is superior to a devout Sunni. This exegesis of *aş-şirātul-mustaqīm* is quite political as the right path is not but Islām.

Appositely, the message of Q9:84 debunked the claim that the Prophet (PBUH) was ignorant of some pretenders among his companions. So the injunction was specifically revealed to the Prophet (PBUH) to stop observing funeral prayer over the corpse of the hypocrites as he used to do in the past. There is no Prophetic tradition that a non-Muslim prepares the corpse of a Muslim simply because he believes in the caliphates of the first two caliphs. It is impermissible to abandon the corpse of a Muslim as the Prophet (PBUH) instructed that the relatives of the deceased have to hasten up his burial. Although funeral rites in Islām fall under the rule of *farḍ kifāyah* (communal obligation), that is, a duty that is binding on few community residents. But if the residents had neglected the action, they would all share the sin of not fulfilling a religious duty towards their deceased brother.<sup>55</sup> Hence, the juristic verdict of the Twelvers that bathing the corpse of a *nāşib* is not compulsory in the absence of a non-Muslim has no place in Islamic tenets.

The Twelver tradition claiming that there is no distinction between a *nāşib*'s righteous and evil deed contravenes Allāh's divine justice to reward even a *kāfir* (infidel) for his good deeds in this ephemeral life. Also, it is absurd to observe prayer behind a *nāşib* when one's life is not endangered since the observer believes the forfeiture of the prayer reward. Conversely, if the Twelvers had considered the *nawāşib* (*Ahlul-Bayt* adversaries) to be filthier than dogs, it is irrational to sanction mingling with them during the pilgrimage period at the *ka'bah* which is a self-contradiction between the Shiite tenet and practice.

Based on the provisions of Q8:41 and Q59:7, both Sunni and Shiite sources established the right of *khums* (one-fifth alms) for the Prophet's household. This divine entitlement is allotted to them from war spoils (*ghanīmah*) and tribute (*fāy'*), and not from the wealth accumulated from one's hard labour.<sup>56</sup> Ja'far aş-Şādiq held that *khums* are deducted

exclusively from the war spoils.<sup>57</sup> Similarly, the tradition of Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq permitting usurpation of the *nāṣib*'s wealth and allocating one-fifth of it to the Shiite Imām could not be attributed to the Prophet (PBUH) and his household. The absence of the Twelfth Imām who has gone into occultation proves the legislation of *khums* in Twelver Shiism a *bid'ah* (heresy). Likewise, the idea of paying one-fifth of alms from a *nāṣib*'s wealth with the intent of purifying it amounts to nought. The Tradition of the Wretched (*ḥadīthul-muflis*) warns against defrauding one another as it could jeopardise one's meritorious acts in the afterlife.

The alleged verdict of Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq allowing the murder of a *nāṣib* tends to precipitate terrorism, oppression and disunity. This tradition could also make the dream of the Shiite-Sunni reconciliation a deceptive mirage. Since the Twelvers upheld that the blood of the non-Shiites or Sunnis is lawful, it aggravates the fear of the Sunnis as they see them as their manifest enemies. Succinctly, Q4:93 views homicide as a heinous crime that attracts hellfire, while Q5:32 compares the offence of murder to that of a person who has killed the entire humanity. By and large, Q60:8-9 had permitted the Muslims to wage war against the non-Muslims only when they were hindered from observing their religious rites or they were driven out of their homes. If such was the case of the non-Muslims, the Shiite tradition allowing the murder of innocent non-Shiite Muslims could not be linked to the impeccable Twelve Imāms.

## Conclusion

The paper concluded that the concept of *naṣb* was said to have evolved during the time of the Prophet (PBUH), but it later became popular in the periods of the fifth and the sixth Shiite Imams, Muḥammad Al-Bāqir and Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq. Similarly, the study affirmed that the word *nāṣib* is frequently used for the non-Shiite in modern times.

The Shiite source had established that there was no mention of *nāṣib* until the incident of 'iḥk erupted in Madinah, while the research submitted that the revelation of Q24:11 had exonerated the alleged wife of the Prophet (PBUH) from the rumour mongering of the Madinan hypocrites. Additionally, the paper revealed that the Twelver accusation of *naṣb* levelled against Abū Ḥanīfah for postulating his *ijtihād* (independent reasoning) alongside Hz. Ali's is antithetical to the Islamic teachings which held that the door of *ijtihād* is open.

Moreover, it is unequivocal that the perception of *naṣb* in Twelver Shiism encapsulates hostility to the *Ahlul-Bayt* Imams and the Shiites, either by taking up arms against them or opposing their views. Several recurrent Twelver traditions maintained that a *nāṣib* who denies Hz. Ali's exclusive right to Imamate occupies a similar status to that of the non-Muslims.

Furthermore, the research viewed that neglecting the corpse of a *nāṣib* might make the Muslims in a given society sinful for abandoning a communal obligation. Reference was made to the Shiite verdict on the prayer rituals of the *nawāṣib* and the guiding principles of

interacting with them. The research submitted that since the Twelvers are legally permitted to mingle with the *nawāṣib* while performing pilgrimage rites in Makkah, it is not far-fetched that praying behind the *nawāṣib* could also be allowed without necessarily resorting to faith dissimulation (*taqiyyah*). Therefore, the alleged tradition allowing denigration of the *nawāṣib* and comparing them to the Magians of the Prophet's nation is illusionary.

The paper observed that the Shiite tradition allowing payment of one-fifth alms (*khums*) from the confiscated property of a *nāṣib* to the Shiite Imām depicts usurpation of people's wealth and could not be said to have emanated from the *Ahlul-Bayt* Imams. Similarly, the tradition allowing the murder of the *nawāṣib* is spurious as it contradicts the injunction of Q5:32. Finally, the research upheld that the Twelver tradition invalidating the Shiite marriage to the non-Shiite Muslims is contradictory to the marital relations between the Prophet (PBUH) and his Companions.

## References

- <sup>1</sup> Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, ed. J.M. Cowan (London: Macdonald and Evans Limited, 1980), p. 498.
- <sup>2</sup> ʿAbdur-Raḥmān Ad-Dimashqiyyah, 'A Calm Dialogue between Ahlus-Sunnah and the Shīʿah,' in *Shiism Exposed*, ed. Salmah Yunus, 2nd ed. (Malaysia: Dakwah Corner Publications, 2015), pp. 27-28.
- <sup>3</sup> Musa O. A. Abdul, *The Historical Origin of Islām* (Lagos: Islamic Publications Bureau, 1978), pp. 85-86.
- <sup>4</sup> A. Rahim, *Islamic History* (Lagos: Islamic Publications Bureau, 2001), pp. 123-124.
- <sup>5</sup> Al-Ḥasan bin Mūsā An-Nawbakhtī, *Firaqus-Shīʿah*, 1st ed. (Lebanon: Manshūratur-Riḍā, 2012), pp. 57-58.
- <sup>6</sup> Muḥammad Bāqir Al-Majlisī, *Biḥāru 'l-Anwār Al-Jāmiʿatu Lidurari Akhbāri 'l-A'immatil- Aṭhār*, Vol. 25, 3rd ed. (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā'it-Turāthil-ʿAraby, n.d.), p.286.
- <sup>7</sup> ʿAbdu ʿAli bin Jumʿah Al-ʿArūsī, *Tafsīr Nūrith-Thaqalayn*, Vol. 4, 1st ed. (Beirut: Mu'assasatut-Tārikh Al-ʿAraby, n.d.), 72.
- <sup>8</sup> ʿAbdullāh bin Muḥammad An-Nāshi'ul-Akbar, *Masā'ilul-Imāmah wa Muqtaṭafātu minal-Kitābil-Awsat fi 'l-Maqālāt* (Beirut: Darun-Nashr, 1971), 22-23.
- <sup>9</sup> Muḥibbullāh ʿAli, *Faḍl Ahlil-Bayt wa Makānatuhum fil-Islām* (Ilorin: Jamāʿatu Atbāʿith- Thaqalayn, 2004), p. 5.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- <sup>11</sup> AbdulGaniy Oloruntele, *The Sunni and the Shīʿa: History, Doctrines and Discrepancies* (Bloomington: iUniverse, 2016), pp. 111-113.
- <sup>12</sup> ʿAli, *Faḍl Ahlil-Bayt*, pp. 11-13.
- <sup>13</sup> Oloruntele, *The Sunni and the Shīʿa*, pp. 48-49.
- <sup>14</sup> ʿAli Aṣ-Ṣādiq, *Madhā Taʿrif ʿAn An-Nuṣāyriyyah*, 1st ed. (n.p: n.p, 2013), p. 9.
- <sup>15</sup> ʿAbdullāh bin Muḥammad As-Salafī, 'Fundamental Shiite Beliefs,' in *Shiism Exposed*, ed. Salmah Yunus, 2nd ed. (Malaysia: Dakwah Corner Publications, 2015), p. 132.
- <sup>16</sup> Al-Majlisī, *Biḥāru 'l-Anwār*, Vol. 65, p. 97.
- <sup>17</sup> Badr bin Nāṣir Al-ʿAwwād, *An-Naṣb wan-Nawāṣib Dirāsaton Tārikhiyyatun 'Aqadiyyah*, 1st ed. (Riyad: Maktabah Al-Malk Fahd Al-Wataniyyah, 1431 AH), p. 81.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

- <sup>19</sup> Akbar Shah Najeebabadi, *The History of Islām*, Vol. 1, 1st ed. (Riyād: Darussalam International Publishers and Distributors, 2000), pp. 478-479.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 488-491.
- <sup>21</sup> Ahmad Ar-Rahmani Al-Hamdani, *Al-Imām 'Ali bin Abī Tālib* (Tehran: Maktabatus-Saduq, 1344 AH), pp. 134-137.
- <sup>22</sup> Muḥammad bin Aḥmad Adh-Dhahbī, *Siyar A'ālāmin-Nubalā'*, Vol. 4, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Mu'assasatur-Risālah, 1982), pp. 37-38.
- <sup>23</sup> Al-Imam Al-Khumāynī, *Kitābuṭ-Ṭahārah*, Vol. 3, 1st ed. (Tehran: Mu'assasatu Tanzim wan-Nashr Āthārīl-Imam Al-Khumāynī, 1380 AH), pp. 457-458.
- <sup>24</sup> Nebil Husayn, *Opposing the Imām: The Legacy of the Nawāṣib in Islamic Literature* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2021), p. 15.
- <sup>25</sup> Safi-ur-Rahman Al-Mubarakpuri, *Ar-Raheeq Al-Makhtūm (The Sealed Nectar)*, 1st ed. (Riyād: Dar-us-Salam Publications, 1996), pp. 334-336.
- <sup>26</sup> Al-Hamdani, *Al-Imām 'Ali*, p. 128.
- <sup>27</sup> Muhibbullah Ali (The Shiite Leader in Ilorin, Kwara State), interviewed by the researcher, August 30, 2022.
- <sup>28</sup> Abdullah Mustafa Berende (Leader of The Islamic Movement in Nigeria, Kwara State Chapter), interviewed by the researcher, August 22, 2021.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. 9, *Ḥadīth* Number: 12548, p. 486.
- <sup>30</sup> Al-Ḥurru'l-ʿĀmilī, *Tafṣīl Wasā'ilish-Shī'ah Ilā Taḥṣīl Masā'ilish-Sharī'ah*, Vol. 7, 4th ed. (Qom: Mu'assasatu Ahlil-Bayt Li Ihya'it-Turāth, 1438 AH), *Ḥadīth* Number: 12559, pp. 490-491.
- <sup>31</sup> Ḥusayn bin Muḥammad Al-Baḥrānī, *Al-Maḥāsin An-Nafsāniyyah fī Ajwibatil Masā'il Al-Khurāsāniyyah*, 1st ed. (n.p: Dārul-Lawāmi' Lit-Taḥqīq wan-Nashr, 2018), pp. 251-254.
- <sup>32</sup> Ni'matullāh Al-Jazā'irī, *Al-Anwār An-Nu'māniyyah*, Vol. 2, 1st ed. (Beirut: Mu'assatul- A'lamī Lil Matbū'āt, 2010), pp. 267-268.
- <sup>33</sup> 'Ali bin Ibrāhīm Al-Qummī, *Tafṣīr Al-Qummī*, Vol. 1, 1st ed. (Qom: Mu'assasatu'l-Imām Al-Mahdī, 1435 AH), p.54.
- <sup>34</sup> Oloruntele, *The Sunni and the Shī'a*, p.56.
- <sup>35</sup> Muhsin Al-Mu'allim, *An-Nuṣb wan-Nawāṣib*, 1st ed. (Beirut: Darul-Hadī Lit-Tibaah wan-Nashr wat-Tawzi, 1997), p.609.
- <sup>36</sup> 'Āmilī, *Tafṣīl Wasā'ilish-Shī'ah*, Vol. 1, *Ḥadīth* Number: 560, p.220.
- <sup>37</sup> Al-Khumāynī, *Kitābuṭ-Taharah*, Vol. 3, p.457.
- <sup>38</sup> Yusuf Al-Baḥrānī, *Al-Ḥadā'iqun-Nāḍirah fī Aḥkāmi'l-Itratiṭ-Ṭāhirah*, Vol. 5, 3rd ed. (Beirut: Dāru'l-Aḍwā' Liṭṭibā'ati wan-Nashr, 1993), p.158.
- <sup>39</sup> Al-Mu'allim, *An-Nusb*, p. 612.
- <sup>40</sup> Al-Baḥrānī, *Al-Ḥadā'iqun-Nāḍirah*, Vol. 5, p.158.
- <sup>41</sup> Al-Mu'allim, *An-Nusb*, p. 614.
- <sup>42</sup> Al-Majlisī, *Bihāru'l-Anwār*, Vol. 8, p.356.
- <sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. 27, p.235.
- <sup>44</sup> Al-Mu'allim, *An-Nusb*, p. 613.
- <sup>45</sup> 'Āmilī, *Tafṣīl Wasā'ilish-Shī'ah*, Vol. 1, *Ḥadīth* Number: 319, pp.126-127.
- <sup>46</sup> Al-Hamdani, *Al-Imam Ali*, p.128.
- <sup>47</sup> Muhammad Hasan An-Najafī, *Jawāhirul-Kalām fī Sharḥ Sharā'i'il-Islām*, Vol. 23, 1st ed. (Qum: Mu'assasatun-Nashr Al-Islami, 1430 AH), pp.109-110.
- <sup>48</sup> Al-Mu'allim, *An-Nusb*, p.615.
- <sup>49</sup> 'Āmilī, *Tafṣīl Wasā'ilish-Shī'ah*, Vol. 9, *Ḥadīth* Number: 12551, pp.487-488.

- 
- <sup>50</sup> Al-Majlisī, *Biḥāru 'l-Anwār*, Vol. 27, *Ḥadīth* Number: 39, p.231.
- <sup>51</sup> ʿAlī Namāzī Ash-Shārūdī, *Mustadrak Saḡīnatil-Biḥār*, Vol. 10, 1st ed. (Tehran: Mu'assasatul-Bi'thah, 1459 AH), p.60.
- <sup>52</sup> Al-Mu'allim, *An-Nusb*, p.618.
- <sup>53</sup> ʿĀmilī, *Taḡṡīl Wasā'ilish-Shī'ah*, Vol. 20, *Ḥadīth* Number: 26329, p.553.
- <sup>54</sup> Muḥammad bin Ya'qūb Al-Kulāynī, *Al-'Uṡūl Mina'l-Kāḡf*, Vol. 1, *Ḥadīth* Number: 3 2nd ed. (Tahran: Maktabatuṡ-ṡadūq, 1281 AH), p.377.
- <sup>55</sup> Bilal Philips, *Funeral Rites in Islām*, 2nd ed. (Riyadh: International Islamic Publishing House, 2005), pp.55-56.
- <sup>56</sup> ʿAbdur-Razzāq ʿAbdī'l-Majīd Alaro, *Al-Āl Wa'l- Aṡḡāb Aḡibbā' Lā 'A'adā'*, 1st ed. (Sokoto: Ahlulbait and Sahaba Foundation, Nigeria, 2017), p.36.
- <sup>57</sup> Aṡ-ṡadūq Bābawayḡ Al-Qummī, *Kitāb Man lā Yaḡḡduruḡu'l-Faqīḡ*, Vol. 2, 1st ed. (Beirut: Mu'assasatu'l-A'lamī Lil-Maṡbū'āt, 1986), *Ḥadīth* Number: 1646, p.26.